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INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING OF DIRECTOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL FOR HIGH INFORMATION ORGANIZATION, AND CONSULTANTS ON MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1950, IN OFFICE OF DIRECTOR

PRESENT: Department of State - Mr. Barrett, Director
- Mr. Stone, Executive Secretary
Department of Defense - General Magruder
Joint Chiefe of Staff - Admiral Stevens
National Security Resources Board - Mr. Sheppard
Central Intelligence Agency - 25X1A

Mr. Barratt introduced Mr. Averill Harrisan who had recently returned from Tokyo and Korea.

Wr. Harriman reported informally on his observations of psychological warfare activities during his visit. He said that he did not have an opportunity to make a first-hand survey of this problem but had talked wit Ambass dor Muscio in Korea and Mr. Sebold, our political advisor in Tokyo. He did not discuss the problem directly with General MacArthur or General Willoughby, but had brought back certain reports which had been prepared for him. On the basis of his discussions with Muscio, Mr. Harriman felt that everyone recognizes the importance of psychological warfare, that they had improvised very well to meet immediate needs but that they need additional help.

Mr. Harriman emphasized the point that the South Koreans have maintained surprisingly good morale. He had traveled a considerable distance throughout the country without any sense of danger from disaffected elements and had found everywhere an atmosphere of surprising confidence. Our military and political people believe that if a fair election could be held under UN auspices, it would result in a large anti-communist majority. The people and armed forces of South Korea are cooperating effectively with us in preserving order and maintaining security. Mr. Harriman commented that he felt that we right take better advantage of opportunities for using South Koreans to help us. For example, while our troops are generally read-bound, we might make use of the local knowledge of the South Koreans for intelligence purposes and in unconventional methods of warfare. In this connection General Magruder commented on a cable from Ambassador Muccio regarding the urgent need for small arms for guarilla activities. Mr. Harriman agreed that this was an urgent need and again stressed the value of South Korean native groups.

General Magruder and Admiral Stevens referred to several current messages indicating that our headquarters in both Tokyo and Korea are very much alive to the psychological warfare problem. Further discussion

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brought out the fact that current telegrams from Tokyo are not reaching Mr. Barrett or the Consultants promptly. It was agreed that steps should be taken to assure that prompt distribution of communications between Washington and Tokyo. It was also agreed that a telegram should be sent to Tokyo suggesting the possibility of sending one or two qualified people to review psychological warfare needs on the spot. The Executive Secretary was requested to prepare a draft telegram on these lines.

evidence of Chinese participation in Korea. He had brought back a report on this subject which was not entirely conclusive. In this connection, our policy with regard to identification of Chinese Communist participation was discussed briefly. General Magruder, while questioning the wisdom of identifying the Chinese in overt propaganda, thought that covert channels might be used effectively. Mr. Barrett undertook to review the policy aspects of the matter with the State Department.

As time did not permit discussion of other items on the agenda, it was agreed to hold a special meeting the following day, August 15 at 4 p.m.

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